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Abstract 
How individual characters affect the ex ante moral hazard of basic medical insurance still remain academically 
debatable. This paper based on divergent individual characters of insurers to analyze the roles of basic health insurance 
on the ex ante moral hazard. It found health level, marital status, income level and age are the key individual factors 
affecting ex ante moral hazard of basic health insurance. But the roles of rural-urban difference and gender are not 
obvious. It gives supplementary explanations to the medical service expenditure, waste of medical resources and other 
issues, and also put forward the corresponding policy recommendations. 
Keywords: Ex ante moral hazard, Basic medical insurance, Individual characters 
1. Introduction 
The comprehensive coverage of basic medical insurance is the key issue of for narrowing social income gaps and 
guarantee public welfares, especially for lifting the availability of residents' medical services and alleviating poverties 
due to illness. However, it also has some problems such as the ambiguity of security objects, system fragmentation and 
lack of connections. What’s more important, there will also be some negative effects like moral hazard. 
In existing studies, moral hazard could be divided into ex ante and ex post. Thereinto, the ex ante moral hazard means 
because the insurer faces a lower marginal expenditure on medical services, they have tendencies to reduce the 
investment in risk prevention in advance, resulting in an increase in the probability of risk (illness). 
In the context of the current rising expenditure and the serious waste of utilization on medical services, this paper based 
on the individual characters of insurers to analyze the roles of basic health insurance on the ex ante moral hazard. It 
could give supplementary explanations to the medical service expenditure, waste of medical resources and other issues, 
and put forward the corresponding policy recommendations. 
The contributions of this paper are as belows. First, from the perspective of bad behavior and unhealthy dietary 
structure, we analyzed the role of demand-side factors that have caused current increasing medical spending. It can 
provide a way to avoid the ex ante moral hazard, reduce the excessive medical services and solve the doctor-patient 
conflict. 
Second, as one of the basic institutions for residents to resist the risk of disease and ensure their own health, we 
analyzed the impact of basic medical insurance on the ex ante moral hazard, and the mechanism of different individual 
characteristics in it. It can not only put forward effective suggestions for the government to integrate the current 
fragmented medical insurance, but also provide detailed and perfect suggestions for the government to control the ex 
ante moral hazard according to the health status, marital status, income level and age difference of insurers. 
Third, this paper based on China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study (CHARLS) 2013, an open, high-quality 
micro-survey database. The macroeconomic policy research based on microcosmic in this paper has stronger 
preciseness and credibility than the general use of macro data. 
The rest of the paper is as below. Chapter 2 is literature review. Chapter 3 is theretical analysis. Chapter 4 is the 
methodology. Chapter 5 is empirical results. Chapter 6 is robustness check. And Chapter 7 concludes. 
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2. Literature Review 
Compared with the ex post moral hazard, the study of the ex ante moral hazard has begun to rise in recent years. Ehrlich 
and Becker (1972) first raised ex ante moral hazard: when patients take part in commercial or public medical insurance, 
the marginal price of medical service they face decreases. Hence the medical insurance plays the role of smoothing 
income, and their motivation of self-protection and prevention decreases, which produces ex ante moral hazard. 
However, there is a lot of controversies about the ex ante moral hazard in academic circles. At present, the empirical 
research is generally divided into two categories, one used bad living habits to measure the existence of ex ante moral 
hazard. The other measured the ex ante moral hazard by using the changes of calorie intake and dietary structure of the 
insurers after insurance. 
Newhouse (1993) found the amount of health insurance will not have an impact on bad living habits. But Stanciole 
(2008) found health insurance promotes smoking, obesity and sedentary tendencies, but has a mitigating effect on 
alcoholism. Medicare may have direct and indirect effects on the health behavior of the elderly (Dave and Kaestner, 
2009). The direct impact is to promote their bad living habits. But the indirect impact is due to the increase in the 
frequency of medical treatment after insurance, doctors will convey health-related information to them, thus inhibiting 
the poor health behavior of the insured (Spenkuch, 2012).  
But some scholars have come to different conclusions. Courbage and Coulon (2004) has shown that medical insurance 
does not cause ex ante moral hazard. Simon, Soni and Cawley (2017) and Ghislandi et al (2015) also came to the same 
conclusion. The expansion of medical insurance coverage can promote the reduction of people's unhealthy behavior 
(Rezayatmand, Pavlova and Groot, 2012). The coverage of government health counselling plays an important role, 
especially by strengthening the cooperation between clinicians and the community, which can reduce the bad health 
behavior and financial burden of residents (Krist et al., 2010). Therefore, different incentive strategies are proposed for 
different insured groups (Fronstin, 2009). 
In addition to the fact that bad living habits will affect people's health, the change of dietary structure, especially the 
intake of high calorie diet, is also an important factor to measure the existence of ex ante moral hazard. Klick and 
Stratmann (2007) found  improving the level of protection for diabetes treatment in medical insurance can also 
increase the Body Mass Index (BMI) of the treated population, which indirectly proves the existence of ex ante moral 
hazard. On the contrary, Rashad and Markowitz (2009) found there is only a weak positive correlation between medical 
insurance coverage and BMI, which will not lead to obesity among insurers. The increase in coverage and the amount 
of compensation does not result in an increase in BMI, but increases the probability of obesity, and causes the 
heterogeneity in private and public insurance (Grossman and Mocan, 2011). 
To sum up, the conclusions of the existing research are controversial in terms of medical insurance and ex ante moral 
hazard. In terms of medical access rate, a large number of literature believes that medical insurance can promote the 
utilization of medical services and improve the health status of residents, but there are also a small number of contrary 
views. In terms of out-of-pocket medical expenses, most of them think that medical insurance can reduce the family 
burden of residents, and there is also heterogeneity. In the aspect of ex ante moral hazard, most of them think that 
medical insurance can promote bad health behavior, but also is not conducive to the dietary structure of residents. 
3. Theoretical Analysis 
This chapter first expounds the source of moral hazard through the elasticity of price demand, and analyzes relevant 
individual characteristics and puts forward hypotheses according to some previous research conclusions.  
As Figure 1 shows, as a kind of normal consumer goods, the consumption of medical services decreases gradually with 
the rise of price, and the demand curve tilts to the lower right. In the absence of basic health insurance (D1), consume X1 
of medical services at P1. When the basic medical insurance is involved, it reduces the elasticity of consumers' price 
demand for medical services. On the one hand, this reflects the protective effect of medical insurance on personal 
income, and the elasticity of price demand faced by insurers becomes smaller after participating in the insurance (from 
D1 to D2 ). Under the same price, the insurers are willing to consume more medical services, which makes themselves 
more "rich". That is, it mitigates the impacts and shocks of medical service expenses caused by income level restriction. 
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Figure 1. The Effect of Basic Medical Insurance on the Demand Curve of Service Utilization 
 
On the other hand, as third parties share some of the spending on health services, the price of health services relative to 
consumers has fallen and demand has increased. And with the increase of the payment amount of basic medical 
insurance, the elasticity is increasing, that is, the demand curve is getting steeper and steeper (from D1 to D2). When 
health insurance covers all the costs of medical services, consumers need the maximum amount of their medical 
services X2. At this point, the demand curve is perpendicular to the X axis (D2), and the specific amount of increase in 
medical services depends on the price elasticity of medical services. 
No matter which of the above aspects are analyzed, the insurers has the motivation to produce ex ante moral hazard. 
When basic health insurance relieves the impact of expensive health care costs, insurerss are more flexible in their own 
income. If they have bad living habits at this time, it is likely that there will be ex ante moral hazard. When the basic 
medical insurance increases the medical service demand of insurers, it is necessary to consider the insurer's time 
preference. It is possible that the insurers do not consume the medical service instantaneously when the consumption 
increases at that time. In this case, it's not just medical care, it's more about health care needs. They may tend to shift the 
demand to the future. Similarly, if they have bad habits like smoking, drinking, etc, it is likely for them to transfer the 
demand to the future. Based on the above analysis, we propose the hypothesis: 
H0: Basic medical insurance will produce ex ante moral hazard. 
From the analysis in the previous section, we have made clear the source of moral hazard. It should be emphasized that 
the process of moral risk arising from basic medical insurance is not clear. There are many individual characteristics 
that play an important role in it (Dave and Kaestner, 2009). From these studies, we can see the heterogeneity of ex ante 
moral hazard based on individual characteristics. Therefore, in this chapter, we systematically explore the role and 
mechanism of these factors in the process of ex ante moral hazard. 
(1) health level. Health level has always been one of the individual characteristic factors concerned by scholars about ex 
ante moral hazard. Many scholars have proved that basic medical insurance can promote the utilization of medical 
services. Compared with the people with higher health level, the people with low health level consume more medical 
services, and have more contact and communication with hospitals, doctors and other medical service providers. In the 
process, doctors will send them disease-related information (such as smoking is harmful to health, etc.) and prevention 
information. These people may increase their preventive input to the disease after obtaining information. It is under this 
kind of supervision and repeated reminder that the poor health behavior of the people with low health level is relatively 
weak. Many scholars have found that there is a significant correlation between health standards and bad living habits. 
We use CHARLS data samples from people aged 45 and over. It is not only based on the self-assessment of health 
status, but also takes chronic diseases as one of the indicators, which has a certain degree of objectivity. 
Based on the above analysis, this paper puts forward the following hypothesis: 
H1: In the population with better health, the ex ante moral hazard is stronger, and vice versa. 
(2) marital status. Marriage is also an important factor affecting bad health behavior. 
Kendler et al (2017) found that marriage can not only reduce the drinking behavior of people who have no history of 
drinking, but also reduce the drinking behavior of individuals with a history of drinking in the family. At the same time, 
marriage is more effective for men, because women pay more attention to health, and can remind men at any time after 
marriage to reduce their unhealthy behavior. The main view of the marriage crisis model is that marital crisis (including 
X 0 
P1 
D1 
X1 X2 
P 
D2 
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divorce) promotes unhealthy behavior and increases the risk of death. Feng et al (2014) found that the probability of 
mental damage in single or widowed individuals was higher than that in married people, and the effect on men was 
more significant. People who are unhappy in marriage may have a lonely personality and a more depressed mood. They 
need tobacco and alcohol to kill time and soften themselves. When basic health insurance reduces the price of medical 
services, this group of people may be more likely to aggravate their unhealthy behavior. Based on the above analysis, 
this paper puts forward the following hypothesis: 
H2: People with poorer marital status are more likely to have ex ante moral hazard, and vice versa. 
(3) Income level. The relationship between income and health is a hot spot in health economics. The high income group 
has more channels and quantities to obtain health information from the outside world, and can even buy health 
information. This information makes individuals pay more attention to their health, thus reducing the probability of 
prior moral hazard. Many literature show a positive correlation with health at a high income level, and an inverted 
U-shaped relationship between income gap and health (Yu and Wang, 2017). Based on the above analysis, this paper 
puts forward the following hypothesis:  
H3: The ex antemoral hazard is stronger among the people with higher income level, and vice versa. 
(4) Urban-rural differences. The difference between urban and rural areas is also an individual characteristic factor in 
the process of generating ex ante moral hazard. The probability of smoking in rural residents is higher than that in urban 
residents, which is related to the difference of traditional habits and health awareness (Rong, Yu, Zhang and Hu, 2010). 
The number of smoking and drinking in rural patients is higher than that in urban patients, but the frequency of exercise 
and physical examination is smaller than that in urban patients (Labuhn, Carolyn, Koon and Mullooly, 2010). Based on 
the above research, we think that due to some social status and living habits factors, the tendency of rural residents to 
have bad living habits is more serious than that of urban residents. Urban residents are relatively in an open information 
environment. Under the reminder of these information, urban residents may reduce their bad living habits, and the 
probability of ex ante moral hazard is less. Based on the above analysis, this paper puts forward the following 
hypothesis: 
H4: The ex ante moral hazard in the rural residents is stronger than urban residents. 
(5) Gender difference. The gender heterogeneity of ex ante moral hazard is also worthy of discussion. Studies have 
shown that men are more likely to smoke, drink and exercise than women, but the probability of physical examination is 
lower than that of women (Stanciole, 2008; Courbage and Coulon, 2004; Rezayatmand, Pavlova and Groot, 2012). 
Rashad and Markowitz (2009) also found The BMI index and the probability of obesity in men are higher than those in 
women. Men are the main sources of family economy. Compared with women, they will face more family and social 
conflicts (Farré, 2013). In addition, men also have more social activities than women (Kim, 2010). Because they are 
busy at work and spend less time in leisure exercise, men have a higher BMI index and an increased probability of 
being overweight and obese. Based on the above analysis, this paper puts forward the following hypothesis: 
H5: Ex ante moral hazard is more likely to occur in men than in women. 
(6) Age difference. The ex ante moral hazard of people in different age groups is also an important research angle. 
Young people have a high pressure in their lives and work, and it is more possible for them to relieve the pressure by 
smoking and alcohol (Mccool, Cameron and Petrie, 2005). Elderly people are richer in life experience and are more 
optimistic than the young people in the state of mind (Hagberg, Hagberg and Saveman, 2002). At the same time, with 
the growth of age, their physical function of the body decreases, so their risk of ex ante moral risk may be lower. Based 
on the above analysis, this paper puts forward the following hypothesis: 
H6: Ex ante moral hazard is more likely to occur among young people than elderly people. 
4. Methodology 
The data used in this study are China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study (CHARLS) 2013 established by the 
National Exhibition Research Institute of Peking University. The subject of investigation is the 45-year-old and the 
above population nationwide. CHARLS 2013 annual follow-up questionnaire includes basic information, family, health 
status & function, health care & insurance, work, retirement & pension, income, housing situation and visitor 
observation. We use basic information, health status & function, health care & insurance and income. 
(1) Variables of living habits 
The indicators of non-health used herein include smoking, the number of drinking of different types of wine (winb, 
winep, wineh), activities, BMI and obesity. In the questionnaire, the interviewees first asked whether the interviewees 
used to smoke, and then went on to ask if they still smoked. This article deals with individuals who have smoked before 
and still smoke as Smoking equals to 1. Individuals who have never smoked or who used to smoke and quit smoking 
now set Smoking equals to 0.  
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At the same time, respondents were asked how often and how much they drank in the past year. It were calculated for 
the most recent drink of strong wine (winb), beer (winep), and low wine (wineh). The questionnaire also asked 
respondents about their social activities in the past month. The range of social activities in the questionnaire is wide, 
which includes not only face-to-face interactions with outsiders (such as cross-door, mahjong, dancing, helping others, 
participating in associations or charitable activities, etc.), as well as on-line communication using some software (for 
example, surfing the Internet, stocks, etc.). In this article, the activities were recorded as 1 if yes in the past month, and 
recorded as 0 if no. 
With regard to BMI index and overweight, the height and weight of the interviewees were measured and recorded in the 
physical examination questionnaire, in order to caculate BMI. The respondents also were asked about their waist 
circumference. We set Obesity equals to 1 for male waist circumference>=85cm or female waist>=80cm. Otherwise set 
it as 0. 
(2) Variables of basic medical insurance cost 
The basic medical insurance coverage is located in the medical care and insurance module. The questionnaire asked 
whether the interviewees participated in the urban job insurance, Social endowment insurance for urban residents and 
the new rural social endowment insurance. Then the respondents were asked the premium to be paid each year to take 
part in the insurance. According to the interviewees' annual contribution to the three insurances, this paper synthesizes 
the variable Insurance and takes the logarithm. 
(3) Variables of health status 
The variables of health status are located in the health and functional modules, and four variables are selected as health 
variables. The first is self-assessment of health status (selfhealth), questionnaire randomly divided the interviewees into 
two groups. The questions in the two groups were the same, but the answers were different. The first group is: 1, 
excellent; 2, very good; 3, good; 4, general; 5, not good. In this way, when the interviewees answer 5, selfhealth takes 1, 
and the rest takes 0. The second group is: 1, good; 2, good; 3, general; 4, not good; 5; very bad. In this way, when 
respondents answer 4 or 5, selfhealth takes 1 and the rest is 0. 
Second, we set variables of ability for daily living (lifeability). There are many questions about the ability of daily life 
in the health and functional modules in the questionnaire, and there are four options for interviewees to choose: 1, there 
are no difficulties; 2, there are difficulties but can be completed; 3, there are difficulties in need of help; 4, unable to 
complete. When the interviewees chose 1 or 2, lifeability was recorded as 1, which was regarded as basic barrier in 
daily life. When the interviewees chose 3 or 4, lifeability was recorded as 0, which was regarded as an obstacle to daily 
life. 
Third the interviewees were also asked about their chronic diseases, and a total of 14 chronic diseases were asked: 1, 
hypertension; 2, dyslipidemia; 3, diabetes; 4, cancer and other malignant tumors; 5, chronic lung disease; 6, liver 
disease; 7, heart disease; 8, stroke; 9, kidney disease; 10, digestive system disease; 11, emotional and mental problems; 
12, memory-related diseases; 13, arthritis or rheumatism; 14 asthma. Based on Zhang, Lei, Strauss, and Zhao (2017), if 
patients had serious chronic diseases (one of 4,7,8 or 12), we set major 1 and the rest 0. If the interviewees suffered 
from normal chronic diseases (one of 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 13 or 14), we set minor 1 and the rest 0.  
(4) Variables of individual characters  
The higher the level of education means more health knowledge and lifestyle, and the stronger the willingness to invest 
in health. The level of education is located in the basic information module. The highest academic qualifications are 
interviewed by questionnaire. In this paper, the variable education is 1 for senior high school and above, and the rest is 
0. Gender information is also located in basic information module. In this paper, the variable male is set 1 and female is 
0. Age is also an important personal characteristic variable. In this study, the variable age was set up as the first year of 
each individual, and agegroup was the age grouping variable. The age of all the individuals in the sample was divided 
into three groups: high, middle and low. We set agegroup 1 for high groups and 0 for the rest. 
In addition, according to the marital status, the questionnaire also asked the interviewees about their current marital 
status. This article sets the variables separate and widow. When their spouse is still alive but does not live with his or 
her (or has never married), we set separate 1, and the rest 0. Widow is set to 1 for bereavement, and the rest 0. The 
purpose of this paper is to distinguish among the different effects of no marriage, injury to marriage or the loss of 
spouse on personal behavior. 
Personal income is located in the income module. Under the influence of weather, pest, plant disease and other external 
factors, the income of low-income households varies greatly every month (Lu et al., 2013), which will affect the 
robustness of regression results. At the same time, the monthly household living expenses will basically stabilize at the 
same level, and the error is much smaller than the use of personal monthly income. Therefore, in this paper, it is 
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proposed to set up the variable lnincome: the natural logarithm of the monthly domestic expenditure as an indicator to 
improve the effectiveness of the estimation result (Michael et al., 1997). We also set variables lnincomegroup, which 
were divided into three groups according to their size: the high income group set 1, and the rest 0. Finally, according to 
the type of account where the interviewees live, we set variable hukou. The value of hukou for agricultural account is 1, 
and the non-agricultural account is 0. 
 
Table 1. The List of all Variables 
Name Definition 
Dependent Variables 
wine Drink more than once a month in the past year 
wineb Number of spirits consumed last time in the past year 
winep Number of beers consumed last time in the past year 
wineh Number of low-alcohol drinks consumed last time in the past year 
smoking Smoking or not at present 
activities Engaged in social activities in the past month 
BMI Weight / height 
2
 
wm Waist circumference (cm) 
obesity Obesity (based on waistline criteria) 
Independent Variables 
Insurance Logarithm of contributions to three basic medical insurance 
education High school and above 
selfhealth Self-assessment of health 
lifeability Activity of daily living 
major Serious chronic diseases 
minor Mild chronic diseases 
male Gender 
separate Whether or not to be separated 
widow Widowed or not 
lnincome Monthly average income of the family 
lnincomegroup Income group 
age Age 
agegroup Age group 
hukou Account types 
    
According to the theoretical hypothesis and data form, the linear probability model (LPM) is used in this study.  
                                          
       (        ) 
In the model i is individuals.    is dependent variables.       is individual amount of basic medical insurance 
expense.         is individual characters, included health level, marital status, income level, urban-rural differences 
and gender differences.   
  is a series of control variables. When    is continuous variables, the coefficient of the 
independent variables represents the marginal effect. When    is binary variables of 0 and 1, 
 (                     
 )                       
   
So we can get 
 (                     
 )                      
                                        
           (        ) 
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The model shows that the response probability P is a linear function of independent variables, which we call the linear 
probability model (LPM). LPM will produce two shortcomings: one is the fitted probability may be less than 0 or 
greater than 1, and the other is the partial effect of any explanatory variable with horizontal value is constant 
(Wooldridge, 2003). This two are clearly far from the actual situation. Even so, in the application, the ordinary least 
square regression (OLS) of LPM is still acceptable and widely used. The advantage is that it is easy to calculate and 
obtain the marginal effect. 
To overcome the above problems, we can set the logarithmic unit (Logit Model) and the probability unit model (Probit 
Model), to ensure that the response probability is between 0 and 1: 
 (                     
 )
  (                                       
      )                   (        ) 
In the logarithmic unit model:  
 ( )      ⁄    
In the probability unit model: 
 ( )  (  )   ⁄     ((  )  ⁄ ) 
This is a nonlinear binary response model, and we use maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) (Wooldridge, 2003). 
Although the nonlinear binary response model can avoid the fitting value greater than 1 or less than 0, it also has 
problems that the marginal effect is not easy to calculate and changes with independent variables. The average marginal 
effect, the marginal effect at the mean value of the sample and the marginal effect at a certain representative value are 
generally used to analyze the average marginal effect. For policy analysis, it is usually more meaningful to use the 
average marginal effect or the marginal effect at a representative value. 
The statistical description of all variables is shown in Table 2.  
 
Table 2. The Statistical Description of all Variables 
Name Sample Mean S.E Minimum Maximum 
wine 18371 0.2637 0.4406 0 1 
wineb 3370 2.7777 5.3513 0 100 
winep 2225 26.0747 155.7348 0 3300 
wineh 665 4.1334 7.9252 0 100 
smoking 14937 0.2897 0.4536 0 1 
activities 16819 0.5808 0.4934 0 1 
BMI 12977 3.1694 0.3128 2.4027 12.6235 
wm 13042 86.8113 11.0224 19.5 144.8 
obesity 13042 0.2552 0.4360 0 1 
Insurance 15623 3.9148 1.5107 0 9.5750 
education 17852 0.2676 0.4427 0 1 
age 18564 59.9049 10.2449 16 102 
agegroup 18564 0.3334 0.4714 0 1 
separate 18585 0.0778 0.2678 0 1 
widow 18585 0.1106 0.3136 0 1 
selfhealth 18405 0.2704 0.4442 0 1 
male 18594 0.4766 0.4995 0 1 
lifeability 12645 0.2307 0.4213 0 1 
lnincome 17231 6.2553 1.0305 -0.6931 10.6084 
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lnincomegroup 17231 0.3334 0.4714 0 1 
hukou 18334 0.7739 0.4183 0 1 
major 16921 0.1881 0.3908 0 1 
minor 17332 0.9405 0.2365 0 1 
 
In order to ensure that the OLS estimate satisfies the Gauss Markov Theorem, it is necessary to satisfy the assumption 
of exogenous variables,  
   (     )    
However, there are always some factors and variables that can not be observed and the endogeity issues are inevitable. 
There are three sources of endogeity: missing variable deviation, synchronism (including reverse causality and common 
factor driving) and measurement error. The main variables explored in this paper are basic medical insurance and bad 
living habits. The main problems are simultaneous equation error and self-selection error. However, it has been reported 
that the three basic health insurance policies in China basically cover all the population (Marten et al., 2014). Therefore, 
we thought there is no endogeity in the empirical research of this paper. 
5. Results 
Table 3-Table 5 are the main regression results. The dependent variables in Table 3 include smoking and activities; in 
Table 4 include wine, wineb, winep and wineh; in Table 5 include BMI, wm and obesity. In model (1) we didn’t add the 
intersection of basic medical insurance cost and other individual characters. The results show basic medical insurance 
do increase the probability of smoking for insurers. For every 1 yuan increase in the cost of basic medical insurance, the 
probability of smoking increases by 0.5% (significant at 10% level). This suggests that hypothesis H0 holds, but the role 
of basic medical insurance in leading to ex ante moral hazard is weak. 
Model (2) and (3) add the intersection of basic medical insurance with agegroup and lnincomegroup. The coefficients 
of Insurance is significantly negative, and Insurance*agegroup significantly positive. It shows that the high age group 
increases the negative effect of the cost of basic medical insurance on the probability of smoking. It shows that the high 
age group increases the negative effect of the cost of basic medical insurance on the probability of smoking. The 
probability of smoking is higher in the low age group after purchasing the basic medical insurance, so the ex ante moral 
hazard is higher in the low age group, which verifies hypothesis H6. 
In model (3), the coefficients of Insurance is significantly negative, and the coefficients of Insurance*lnincomegroup 
significantly postive. It shows that ex ante moral hazard in the high-income group is stronger, which verifies H3. Model 
(4) shows that the cost of basic health insurance significantly reduces the number of social activities of insurers, which 
verifies ex ante moral hazard. Model (5) shows that people with poor health can increase the negative effect of medical 
insurance on social activities. It is not in line with H1, which may result from the poor physical quality of these 
individuals and their inability to participate in social activities, which does not indicate that ex ante moral hazard in the 
people with poor health condition is stronger. 
 
Table 3. The Effects of Basic Medical Insurance on Smoking and Activities (OLS) 
Dependent Variables smoking 
（1） 
smoking 
（2） 
smoking 
（3） 
activities 
（4） 
activities 
（5） 
Insurance 0.0049* 
（1.81） 
-0.0025 
（-0.68） 
-0.0003 
（-0.09） 
-0.0158*** 
（-4.37） 
-0.0206*** 
（-4.81） 
education 0.0046 
（0.49） 
0.0052 
（0.53） 
0.0051 
（0.52） 
0.0593*** 
（4.67） 
0.0593*** 
（4.67） 
age -0.0001 
（-0.37） 
-0.0000 
（-0.18） 
-0.0000 
（-0.16） 
-0.0032*** 
（-5.37） 
-0.0032*** 
（-5.43） 
separate 0.0113 
（0.75） 
0.0092 
（0.58） 
0.0094 
（0.59） 
0.0218 
（1.02） 
0.0218 
（1.02） 
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widow 0.0366*** 
（2.92） 
0.0396*** 
（3.04） 
0.0379*** 
（2.91） 
0.0859*** 
（5.04） 
0.0860*** 
（5.05） 
selfhealth 0.0160** 
（2.02） 
0.0164** 
（1.97） 
0.0166** 
（1.99） 
-0.0562*** 
（-5.22） 
-0.0559*** 
（-5.20） 
male 0.6180*** 
（74.81） 
0.6164*** 
（71.72） 
0.6149* 
（1.71） 
-0.0113 
（-1.07） 
-0.0108 
（-1.02） 
lifeability 0.0218** 
（2.32） 
0.0163* 
（1.66） 
0.0168* 
（1.71） 
-0.1028*** 
（-7.94） 
-0.1019*** 
（-7.87） 
lnincomegroup 0.0027 
（0.70） 
0.0018 
（0.45） 
0.0014 
（0.35） 
0.0287*** 
（5.45） 
0.0288*** 
（5.46） 
hukou 0.0070 
（0.69） 
0.0124 
（1.13） 
0.0155 
（1.43） 
-0.1267*** 
（-9.08） 
-0.1264*** 
（-9.07） 
major  0.0201** 
（2.83） 
0.0204** 
（2.14） 
  
Insurance*agegroup  0.0161*** 
（2.83） 
   
Insurance*lnincomegroup   0.0095* 
（1.72） 
  
Insurance*selfhealth     0.0162** 
（2.08） 
N 7916 7916 7285 9401 9401 
Adj R-squared 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.04 0.04 
Note: ***, **, * indicated statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. The t statistics is represented 
in parentheses. Insurance has been centralized. 
 
Table 4. The Effects of Basic Medical Insurance on Alcohol Drinking (OLS) 
Dependent Variables wineb 
（1） 
wineb 
（2） 
wineb 
（3） 
wineb 
（4） 
wineb 
（5） 
winep 
（6） 
winep 
（7） 
winep 
（8） 
wineh 
（9） 
wineh 
（10） 
wineh 
（11） 
Insurance 0.0418 
（0.66） 
-0.0164 
（-0.23） 
-0.0783 
（-0.92） 
-0.0992 
（-1.30） 
-0.6700 
（-1.70） 
-1.1569 
（-0.70） 
-2.8936 
（-1.55） 
-3.8118* 
（-1.71） 
0.3831 
（1.15） 
0.1203 
（0.34） 
-0.1884 
（-0.47
） 
education 0.2077 
（0.97） 
0.2083 
（0.97） 
0.2068 
（0.97） 
0.2554 
（1.14） 
0.2189 
（0.95） 
4.9773 
（0.94） 
5.0277 
（0.95） 
5.1462 
（0.97） 
0.7021 
（0.55） 
0.8034 
（0.63） 
0.7052 
（0.55） 
age -0.0411*
** 
（-3.64） 
-0.0423*
** 
（-3.75） 
-0.0402*
** 
（-3.56） 
-0.0412*
** 
（-3.49） 
-0.0395*
** 
（-3.28） 
-0.2731 
（-0.98） 
-0.2618 
（-0.94） 
-0.2669 
（-0.96） 
-0.0293 
（-0.46
） 
-0.0282 
（-0.44
） 
-0.0614 
（-0.96
） separate 0.3607 
（0.96） 
0.3417 
（0.91） 
0.3573 
（0.95） 
0.2818 
（0.71） 
0.3632 
（0.89） 
-3.8918 
（-0.41） 
-3.5872 
（-0.38） 
-3.3690 
（-0.36） 
-0.1412 
（-0.07
） 
-0.0723 
（-0.03
） 
-0.3081 
（-0.15
） 
widow 0.1394 0.1516 0.1803 0.1845 0.1383 -5.5763 -6.5214 -5.1294 1.7797 2.7142 0.8273 
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（0.38） （0.42） （0.49） （0.48） （0.36） （-0.54） （-0.63） （-0.50） （1.00） （1.48） （0.46） 
selfhealth 0.0636 
（0.30） 
0.0858 
（0.40） 
0.0426 
（0.20） 
0.0164 
（0.07） 
0.0379 
（0.17） 
10.9932
** 
（2.06） 
10.8846
** 
（2.04） 
10.9637
** 
（2.05） 
3.7320*
** 
（2.88） 
3.6054*
** 
（0.06） 
3.0991*
* 
（2.37） 
male 1.0079*
** 
（3.91） 
1.0290*
** 
（3.99） 
1.0065*
** 
（3.91） 
1.1963*
** 
（4.41） 
1.0137*
** 
（3.70） 
-3.3685 
（-0.61） 
-3.3816 
（-0.62） 
-3.5905 
（-0.65） 
-0.7264 
（-0.60
） 
-0.6516 
（-0.54
） 
-0.2611 
（-0.21
） 
lifeability -0.2542 
（-1.04） 
-0.2278 
（-0.93） 
-0.2622 
（-1.08） 
-0.2339 
（-0.91） 
-0.2237 
（-0.86） 
-5.0664 
（-0.77） 
-4.2386 
（-0.65） 
-5.0118 
（-0.77） 
-1.4900 
（-0.95
） 
-1.6060 
（-1.02
） 
-0.8414 
（-0.53
） 
lnincomegroup 0.2030* 
（1.94） 
0.2015* 
（1.92） 
0.2151*
* 
（2.05） 
0.1880* 
（1.73） 
0.2057* 
（1.85） 
2.0130 
（0.74） 
2.1763 
（0.81） 
1.8361 
（0.68） 
0.2943 
（0.45） 
0.3374 
（0.52） 
0.4580 
（0.69） 
hukou -0.1195 
（-0.49） 
-0.1351 
（-0.55） 
-0.2131 
（-0.86） 
-0.1893 
（-0.73） 
-0.0971 
（-0.37） 
-13.8221
** 
（-2.22） 
-14.6710
** 
（-2.35） 
-13.6831
** 
（-2.20） 
-0.8468 
（-0.53
） 
-0.9728 
（-0.61
） 
-0.6824 
（-0.40
） 
major    0.1423 
（0.55） 
      1.6476 
（0.93） 
minor     0.1069 
（0.19） 
      
Insurance*selfhealth  0.2531* 
（1.72） 
    7.6961*
* 
（1.99） 
    
Insurance*agegroup   0.2724*
* 
（2.12） 
        
Insurance*major    0.5853*
** 
（3.88） 
      1.2358* 
（1.74） 
Insurance*minor     0.7381* 
（1.85） 
      
Insurance*lnincome
group 
       5.7303* 
（1.76） 
   
Insurance*widow          1.7458*
* 
（2.02） 
 
N 1518 1518 1518 1407 1428 964 964 964 297 297 278 
Adj R-squared 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.001 
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Table 5. The Effects of Basic Medical Insurance on BMI, Waistline and Obesity (OLS) 
Dependent Variables BMI 
（1） 
BMI 
（2） 
BMI 
（3） 
BMI 
（4） 
BMI 
（5） 
wm 
（6） 
wm 
（7） 
obesity 
（8） 
obesity 
（9） 
Insurance 0.0007 
（0.25） 
0.0025 
（0.87） 
-0.0033 
（-0.93） 
-0.0035 
（-0.97） 
0.0046 
（1.33） 
-0.0839 
（-0.87） 
0.0728 
（0.56） 
0.0010 
（0.37） 
0.0064* 
（1.74） 
education 0.005 
（0.54） 
0.0052 
（0.56） 
0.0049 
（0.52） 
0.0049 
（0.53） 
0.0038 
（0.38） 
0.5237 
（1.55） 
0.5283 
（1.57） 
0.0306*** 
（3.22） 
0.0307*** 
（3.24） 
age -0.0016*** 
（-3.64） 
-0.0015*** 
（-3.61） 
-0.0016*** 
（-3.74） 
-0.0015*** 
（-3.61） 
-0.0016*** 
（-3.57） 
-0.0331** 
（-2.16） 
-0.0338** 
（-2.20） 
-0.0022*** 
（-5.04） 
-0.0022*** 
（-5.09） 
separate 0.0096 
（0.61） 
0.0097 
（0.538） 
0.0100 
（0.63） 
0.0108 
（0.68） 
0.0126 
（0.75） 
-1.6408*** 
（-2.90） 
-1.6342*** 
（-2.89） 
-0.0574*** 
（-3.60） 
-0.0572*** 
（-3.59） 
widow 0.0012 
（0.10） 
-0.0015 
（-0.12） 
0.0014 
（0.11） 
0.0009 
（0.07） 
-0.0015 
（-0.12） 
-0.4145 
（-0.95） 
-0.4381 
（-1.00） 
0.0006 
（0.05） 
-0.0002 
（-0.02） 
selfhealth -0.0210*** 
（-2.70） 
-0.0209*** 
（-2.69） 
-0.0208*** 
（-2.67） 
-0.0210*** 
（-2.70） 
-0.0304*** 
（-3.60） 
-0.4212 
（-1.51） 
-0.4143 
（-1.48） 
-0.0030 
（-0.39） 
-0.0028 
（-0.36） 
male -0.0511*** 
（-6.65） 
-0.0512*** 
（-6.68） 
-0.0507*** 
（-6.61） 
-0.0508*** 
（-6.61） 
-0.0511*** 
（-6.27） 
-1.2366*** 
（-4.49） 
-1.2613*** 
（-4.58） 
0.5512*** 
（71.17） 
0.5504*** 
（70.99） 
lifeability -0.0129 
（-1.36） 
-0.0126 
（-1.33） 
-0.0127 
（-1.34） 
-0.0127 
（-1.34） 
-0.0201** 
（-1.99） 
0.3338 
（0.99） 
0.3395 
（1.00） 
0.0103 
（1.09） 
0.0105 
（1.11） 
lnincomegroup 0.0156*** 
（4.08） 
0.0155*** 
（4.05） 
0.0154*** 
（4.02） 
0.0155*** 
（4.04） 
0.0150*** 
（3.69） 
0.6190*** 
（4.51） 
0.6073*** 
（4.42） 
0.0142*** 
（3.68） 
0.0138*** 
（3.57） 
hukou -0.0505*** 
（-4.82） 
-0.0497*** 
（-4.75） 
-0.0487*** 
（-4.63） 
-0.0505*** 
（-4.82） 
-0.0408*** 
（-3.60） 
-3.1515*** 
（-8.38） 
-3.0422*** 
（-7.99） 
-0.0804*** 
（-7.61） 
-0.0767*** 
（-7.17） 
major     0.0458*** 
（4.74） 
    
insurance*widow  -0.0137* 
（-1.78） 
       
insurance*hukou   0.0093* 
（1.72） 
      
insurance*male    0.0090* 
（1.71） 
     
insurance*major     -0.0123** 
（-2.02） 
    
insurance*agegroup       -0.3518* 
（-1.82） 
 -0.0120** 
（-2.20） 
N 7297 7297 7297 7297 6785 7337 7337 7337 7337 
Adj R-squared 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.43 0.43 
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In Table 4, the coefficients of Insurance is still significantly positive. In model (2)-(5) the coefficients of intersections 
Insurance*selfhealth, Insurance*agegroup, Insurance*major and Insurance*minor is significantly positive. It implies 
individual factors such as health status, age and chronic disease can all affect ex ante moral hazard.  
In detail, in model (2), selfhealth can adjust the effect of Insurance on wineb (significant positive). The negative effect 
of Insurance on wineb is enhanced, which indicates that the ex ante moral risk is stronger in healthy population (H1). In 
model (3), the agegroup of high age can enhance the negative effect of Insurance on wineb, so ex ante moral hazard is 
stronger among young people (H6). Both models (4) and (5) verifies H1. Model (6) imply Insurance can reduce beer 
consumption winep. Model (7) verifies H1. In model (8), Insurance can significantly reduce winep, but the negative 
effect is stronger in the high income group. This is not consistent with H3, which may be because beer comsumption is 
the inferior good to the high income group due to its higher calories and cheaper prices. Model (9) implies Insurance 
has postive effects on wineh, which also indicates ex ante moral hazard. Models (10) and (11) show that marital status 
and health status also regulate the effect of Insurance on wineh. These results verify H1 and H2. 
In Table 5, the coefficients of Insurance*widow, Insurance*hukou, Insurance*male and Insurance*major are 
significant, which imply marital status, differences between urban and rural areas, gender and chronic diseases can all 
affect ex ante moral hazard. 
The coefficient of Insurance*widow in model (2) is significantly negative, contrary to H1. The possible reason is that 
widowed people are depressed, resulting in a relatively light weight, thus offsetting the income effect of basic health 
insurance, which in turn increases food intake. Model (3) shows that rural residents can significantly increase the 
negative effect of basic medical insurance on body weight, that is, to restrain ex ante moral hazard and verify that H4 is 
not valid. Model (4) shows that men's ex ante moral hazard is weaker than women, contrary to previous researches. 
Model (6) explores the effect of Insurance on the waist circumference, also indicating the existence of ex ante moral 
hazard. Model (7) shows that ex ante moral hazard is weaker in the elderly group (H6). This is also the same for model 
(8) and (9). 
6. Robust Check 
In order to verify the robustness and effectiveness of the results, we sue Probit and Logit Models instead. The results are 
given in Table 6 and 7, which show that the empirical results are robust. 
 
Table 6. The Effects of Basic Medical Insurance on Smoking, Drinking and Activities (Probit) 
Dependent Variables wine 
（1） 
wine 
（2） 
smoking 
（3） 
smoking 
（4） 
smoking 
（5） 
smoking 
（6） 
activities 
（7） 
activities 
（8） 
obesity 
（9） 
obesity 
（10） 
Insurance -0.0033 
（-0.30） 
-0.0113 
（-1.00） 
0.0250* 
（1.73） 
-0.0076 
（-0.39） 
0.0027 
（0.14） 
0.0035 
（0.20） 
-0.0448**
* 
（-4.54） 
-0.0606**
* 
（-5.09） 
0.0028 
（0.23） 
0.0451**
* 
（2.79） 
education -0.0149 
（-0.40） 
-0.0167 
（-0.44） 
0.0201 
（0.41） 
0.0214 
（0.44） 
0.0196 
（0.40） 
0.0192 
（0.39） 
0.1607**
* 
（4.76） 
0.1612**
* 
（4.77） 
0.4243**
* 
（10.60） 
0.4246**
* 
（10.59） 
age -0.0089**
* 
（-4.92） 
-0.0090**
* 
（-4.96） 
0.0007 
（0.30） 
0.0007 
（0.31） 
0.0008 
（0.35） 
0.0007 
（0.29） 
-0.0081**
* 
（-5.28） 
-0.0082**
* 
（-5.33） 
0.0149**
* 
（7.74） 
0.0146**
* 
（7.56） 
separate -0.0487 
（-0.77） 
-0.0407 
（-0.64） 
0.0467 
（0.58） 
0.0451 
（0.56） 
0.0454 
（0.57） 
0.0462 
（0.57） 
0.0569 
（1.00） 
0.0570 
（1.01） 
-0.1719** 
（-2.28） 
-0.1685** 
（-2.24） 
widow 0.0700 
（1.25） 
0.0689 
（1.23） 
0.2230**
* 
（3.32） 
0.2293**
* 
（3.41） 
0.2204**
* 
（3.28） 
0.2216**
* 
（3.30） 
0.2233**
* 
（4.98） 
0.2238**
* 
（4.99） 
-0.5370**
* 
（-8.68） 
-0.5446**
* 
（-8.78） 
selfhealth -0.3241**
* 
（-9.42） 
-0.3236**
* 
（-9.40） 
0.0787* 
（1.82） 
0.0784* 
（1.81） 
0.0799* 
（1.85） 
0.0765* 
（1.77） 
-0.1475**
* 
（-5.24） 
-0.1474**
* 
（-5.24） 
-0.0789** 
（-2.20） 
-0.0772** 
（-2.15） 
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male 1.2426**
* 
[38.05] 
1.2458**
* 
（38.11） 
2.0375**
* 
（48.92） 
2.0443**
* 
（48.92） 
2.0370**
* 
（48.89） 
2.0386**
* 
（48.91） 
-0.0318 
（-1.15） 
-0.0305 
（-1.10） 
  
lifeability -0.0551 
[-1.36] 
-0.0561 
（-1.38） 
0.0952* 
（1.93） 
0.0935* 
（1.89） 
0.0970** 
（1.96） 
0.0990** 
（2.00） 
-0.2656**
* 
（-7.86） 
-0.2631**
* 
（-7.79） 
0.0006 
（0.01） 
0.0025 
（0.06） 
lnincomegroup 0.0541**
* 
（3.24） 
-0.0538**
* 
（3.22） 
0.0069 
（0.33） 
0.0091 
（0.44） 
0.0070 
（0.33） 
0.0077 
（0.37） 
0.0758**
* 
（5.48） 
0.0762**
* 
（5.50） 
0.0858**
* 
（4.79） 
0.0820**
* 
（4.56） 
hukou 0.0339 
（0.80） 
0.0365 
（0.86） 
0.0766 
（1.38） 
0.0558 
（0.99） 
0.0730 
（1.31） 
0.0731 
（1.31） 
-0.3473**
* 
（-9.22） 
-0.3479**
* 
（-9.23） 
-0.2058**
* 
（-4.51） 
-0.1749**
* 
（-3.77） 
major   0.1274**
* 
（-8.43） 
0.1264**
* 
（2.63） 
0.1275**
* 
（2.65） 
0.1295**
* 
（2.69） 
    
insurance*separate  0.1148**
* 
（2.67） 
        
insurance*agegroup    0.0715** 
（2.45） 
     -0.0927**
* 
（-3.92） 
insurance*lnincomegro
up 
    0.0477* 
（1.68） 
     
insurance*major      0.0637** 
（2.11） 
    
insurance*selfhealth        0.0500** 
（2.39） 
  
N 9665 9665 7285 7285 7285 7285 9401 9401 7337 7337 
Pseudo R-squared 0.17 0.17 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 
Note: The z statistics is represented in parentheses 
 
Table 7. The Effects of Basic Medical Insurance on Smoking, Drinking and Activities (Logit) 
Dependent Variables wine 
（1） 
wine 
（2） 
smoking 
（3） 
smoking 
（4） 
smoking 
（5） 
smoking 
（6） 
acti 
（7） 
acti 
（8） 
obesity 
（9） 
obesity 
（10） 
Insurance -0.0078 
（-0.42） 
-0.0217 
（-1.11） 
0.0379 
（1.46） 
-0.0234 
（-0.66） 
-0.0010 
（-0.03） 
0.0023 
（0.07） 
-0.0722**
* 
（-4.46） 
-0.9834**
* 
（-5.00） 
0.0065 
（0.32） 
0.0832**
* 
（2.97） 
education -0.0280 
（-0.44） 
-0.0311 
（-0.49） 
0．0395 
（0.46） 
0.0430 
（0.50） 
0.0394 
（0.45） 
0.0378 
（0.44） 
0.2605**
* 
（4.74） 
0.2608**
* 
（4.74） 
0.7131**
* 
（10.61） 
0.7153**
* 
（10.62） 
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age -0.0166**
* 
（-5.26） 
-0.0168**
* 
（-5.30） 
-0.0006 
（-0.15） 
-0.0004 
（-0.10） 
-0.0004 
（-0.10） 
-0.0007 
（-0.16） 
-0.0132**
* 
（-5.31） 
-0.0134**
* 
（-5.36） 
0.0252**
* 
（7.69） 
0.0247**
* 
（7.49） 
separate -0.0812 
（-0.74） 
-0.0603 
（-0.55） 
0.0823 
（0.57） 
0.0785 
（0.54） 
0.0788 
（0.55） 
0.0805 
（0.56） 
0.0926 
（1.01） 
0.0926 
（1.01） 
-0.2957** 
（-2.22） 
-0.2934** 
（-2.20） 
widow 0.1030 
（1.02） 
0.1003 
（0.99） 
0.4230**
* 
（3.27） 
0.4331**
* 
（3.35） 
0.4191**
* 
（3.24） 
0.4212**
* 
（3.26） 
0.3659**
* 
（5.00） 
0.3670**
* 
（5.02） 
-0.9527**
* 
（-8.31） 
-0.9691**
* 
（-8.42） 
selfhealth -0.5715**
* 
（-9.41） 
-0.5706**
* 
（-9.39） 
0.1551* 
（1.94） 
0.1547* 
（1.94） 
0.1580** 
（1.98） 
0.1509* 
（1.89） 
-0.2363**
* 
（-5.21） 
-0.2370**
* 
（-5.23） 
-0.1409** 
（-2.26） 
-0.1369** 
（-2.20） 
male 2.1890**
* 
（36.25） 
2.1942**
* 
（36.31） 
3.5389**
* 
（44.66） 
3.5511**
* 
（44.67） 
3.5380**
* 
（44.65） 
3.5412**
* 
（44.64） 
-0.0512 
（-1.14） 
-0.0492 
（-1.10） 
  
lifeability -0.0976 
（-1.37） 
-0.0989 
（-1.39） 
0.1550* 
（1.70） 
0.1545* 
（1.69） 
0.1578* 
（1.73） 
0.1619* 
（1.77） 
-0.4261**
* 
（-7.85） 
-0.4221**
* 
（-7.77） 
0.0080 
（0.11） 
0.0104 
（0.14） 
lnincomegroup 0.0967**
* 
（3.31） 
0.0957**
* 
（3.27） 
0.0128 
（0.33） 
0.0177 
（0.46） 
0.0134 
（0.35） 
0.0142 
（0.37） 
0.1216**
* 
（5.41） 
0.1221**
* 
（5.43） 
0.1456**
* 
（4.69） 
0.1391**
* 
（4.47） 
hukou 0.0699 
（0.95） 
0.0727 
（0.99） 
0.1472 
（1.45） 
0.1036 
（1.01） 
0.1391 
（1.37） 
0.1403 
（1.38） 
-0.5641**
* 
（-9.10） 
-0.5653**
* 
（-9.11） 
-0.3559**
* 
（-4.66） 
-0.3006**
* 
（-3.85） 
major   0.1898** 
（2.10） 
0.1881** 
（2.08） 
0.1894** 
（2.10） 
0.1991** 
（2.20） 
    
insurance*separate  0.1929**
* 
（2.59） 
        
insurance*agegroup    0.1312** 
（2.52） 
     -0.1642**
* 
（-4.07） 
insurance*lnincomegro
up 
    0.0837* 
（1.65） 
     
insurance*major      0.1070** 
（1.99） 
    
insurance*selfhealth        0.0813** 
（2.39） 
  
N 9665 9665 7285 7285 7285 7285 9401 9401 7337 7337 
Pseudo R-squared 0.17 0.17 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 
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The above empirical studies show that, when a large number of bad habits are used as the index, ex ante moral hazard 
caused by the basic medical insurance is common. Marital status, health status, income level and age are the main 
individual characteristic factors. The influence of urban and rural hukou and gender on ex ante moral hazard needs to be 
further explored. In general, the hypotheses tested in this paper is shown in Table 8: 
 
Table 8. An Overview of the Test for Hypotheses 
H0 H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H6 
   Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
 
We can draw the following conclusions. People with good health are more likely to have ex ante moral hazard. People 
with poor marital status have a stronger ex ante moral hazard. People with high income level have stronger ex ante 
moral hazard. Younger people have stronger ex ante moral hazard. 
The roles of hukou and gender are not obvious. We think the possible reason is that rural people lack some channels to 
carry out unhealthy behavior, or their life pressure is relatively small, and will not sit for long hours because of manual 
work. As to gender, in the context of the adequate supply of women's labour force, the female population also faces 
great work and living pressure, so some unhealthy living habits, such as sedentariness, are inevitable. 
7. Conclusion and Policy Suggestions 
The empirical results show that health level, marital status, income level and age are the key individual factors affecting 
ex ante moral hazard. In this regard, we make the following suggestions. 
First, people with good health are more likely to have ex ante moral hazard. We recommend that the health population 
be encouraged to carry out health services other than treatment services through “health-care fund covering preventive 
medical expenditure”. The cost of these health services (such as fitness and health product consumption) should be 
included in the scope of health insurance reimbursement. This will help to increase their own attention to health and 
correct the concept of  
"Treat the disease seriously and prevent it lightly" in the whole society. It could reduce the production of ex ante moral 
hazard from the source and medical service expenditures. 
Second, people with poor marital status have a stronger ex ante moral hazard. We can encourage some social groups to 
actively participate in it and publicize the correct concept of marriage in traditional culture. We should advocate the 
establishment of harmonious, happy and stable families and actively guide the social atmosphere. The departments of 
civil affairs should support the development of social marriage mediation companies. In detail, Tax benefits can be 
given based on the number of spouses contributed by the company annually. It is also possible to offer the loan 
preferences to these companies to help them in the online website construction. 
Third, people with high income level have stronger ex ante moral hazard. We suggest that enterprises set up small 
gymnasiums for their employees. We also suggest that enterprises set up rest areas for employees to take a nap, and 
provide free coffee, desserts and other meals in the area. These measures not only promote the health of employees, but 
also improve their sense of belonging and security. Enterprises should also strengthen tobacco control in their office 
locations, and reduce unhealthy behavior among employees. 
Fourth, younger people have stronger ex ante moral hazard. For young people with unhealthy lifestyles, we suggest that 
they relieve stress in healthy ways, such as fitness, swimming, etc., rather than smoking and drinking. For young people, 
only by reducing unhealthy behavior can they effectively prevent future mid-life crisis and have a harmonious and 
happy family. 
Finally, the introduction of commercial insurance company funds into the field of social security is conducive to 
alleviating the current decline of health funds in many local governments, which ensures the role of health funds in 
protecting labor reproduction and stabilizing social and economic development. It is necessary to actively guide 
commercial insurance companies into the field of health, strengthen the cooperation between social security institutions 
and commercial insurance companies, and improve the efficiency of the use of health resources, all of which are 
conducive to reducing unhealthy behaviors, controlling the ex ante moral hazard, and then preventing the waste of 
medical resources.  
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